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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal by Michael Todd Brosius from an order 
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Brosius 
was convicted of unpremeditated murder following a 
general court martial, and he is serving a sentence of 
imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the Army 
Court of Military Review, see United States v. Brosius, 37 
M.J. 652 (A.C.M.R. 1993), and the Court of Military Appeals 
granted review but summarily affirmed without opinion. 
See United States v. Brosius, 39 M.J. 378 (C.M.A. 1994). 
Brosius, who is imprisoned at the United States 
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, then filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.S 2241 
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. The District Court denied his petition, 
Brosius v. Warden, 125 F. Supp. 2d 681 (M.D.Pa. 2000), 
and this appeal followed. 
 
I. 
 
At approximately 4:40 a.m. on June 2, 1990, two 
sergeants in the United States Army found Private First 
Class Tammy Ivon near death in the parking lot adjacent to 
the enlisted service members' barracks at the United States 
Army Airfield in Giebelstadt, Germany. When Ivon was 
found, her legs were protruding from under a pickup truck, 
and her jeans had been pulled down to her ankles. One of 
the sergeants noticed a man whom he identified as Brosius 
staring at him from a nearby road. After several seconds, 
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Brosius, who had been a close friend of Ivon's, walked 
away. A short time later, Ivon died. 
 
An autopsy revealed that Ivon had been stabbed 11 
times, four times in the chest, five times in the abdomen, 
and once near each eye. Ivon's car was found parked next 
to the pickup, and the back seat of the car was stained 
with blood. The sign-in log for a gate on the base showed 
that Ivon's car had returned at 2:30 a.m. with two 
occupants. A witness who had passed Ivon's car at about 
3:00 a.m. stated that the windows were fogged, he heard a 
grunt or groan coming from inside, and he thought that the 
occupants were having sex. 
 
Numerous witnesses described Brosius's behavior during 
the hours after Ivon's body was found. A witness who saw 
him at 7:25 a.m. described him as shocked and dazed. At 
7:30 a.m., he told another witness that he had just come 
from working out in the gym although the gym was closed 
at the time. He told another witness that a girl who had 
given him a ride home two hours earlier was dead and that 
he suspected her boyfriend. Brosius then reportedly 
threatened to kill the boyfriend. A short time later, when 
another witness asked Brosius if he had heard about Ivon's 
death, Brosius said that he had not. Brosius then went to 
the laundromat and told a witness who later testified for 
the prosecution that Ivon had given him a ride home that 
night and that he might have been the last person to see 
her alive. He said that he had heard that she had been 
stabbed 11 times. He told another witness who testified for 
the defense that a third person had accompanied Ivon and 
him when they drove back to the base. At 11:10 a.m., he 
awakened his roommate, screaming that Ivon's boyfriend 
had killed her. 
 
Word reached Brosius's first sergeant that Brosius had 
been with the victim on the night of her murder, and the 
first sergeant then provided this information to agents from 
the Criminal Investigation Division ("CID"). Brosius was 
called to the orderly room, and Special Agents Douglas 
Allen and Tyrone Robinson took Brosius into the first 
sergeant's office and spoke with him. Brosius stated that on 
the night of the murder, Ivon had driven another soldier 
and him back to the base from a local club. When Special 
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Agent Allen asked the identity of the third person, Brosius 
replied that he did not wish to say anything about it. 
According to Special Agent Allen, Brosius then requested to 
have a lawyer, his first sergeant, or some other third party 
present to witness his statement. According to Brosius, he 
asked to have a lawyer present, but Brosius admitted that 
it was "possible" that he might have also mentioned his first 
sergeant. Special Agent Allen told Brosius that there were 
lawyers at the CID Headquarters ("the River Building") in 
Wuerzburg and that if he wanted to speak to a lawyer or 
someone else, he should go there. Sergeant Pickett, 
Brosius's section sergeant, drove him to the River Building. 
Sergeant Pickett and Brosius were acquaintances. App. 75. 
 
At the River Building, Special Agent Mark Nash 
questioned Brosius without administering any warning of 
rights. Special Agent Nash told Brosius that the victim's 
boyfriend was the main suspect and that if Brosius"was 
worried about rights or anything being violated, if you start 
to say anything that we think would be incriminating 
against you, we would stop you and advise you of your 
rights." App. 19-20. Special Agent Nash told Brosius that 
Captain Harper Ewing would be available to witness the 
interview. Captain Ewing was the prosecutor assigned to 
the case. 
 
When Captain Ewing arrived, Brosius recognized him as 
an attorney who had represented him in an earlier civil 
matter. Captain Ewing asked Brosius some questions about 
the prior representation in order to ascertain whether there 
was a conflict that would prevent him from prosecuting the 
case. Special Agent Nash and Captain Ewing both told 
Brosius that Captain Ewing was a prosecutor and was 
"working with the cops," but Brosius did not voice any 
objection. Captain Ewing acknowledged, however, that 
Brosius said something to the effect that he wanted an 
attorney present because he did not trust the police and 
feared that they would twist his words. App. 43-44. Captain 
Ewing testified that he thought that Brosius was simply 
requesting someone to record his words accurately and was 
not requesting legal representation, and Special Agent Nash 
testified that Captain Ewing was present at the interview 
for that purpose. Brosius did not ask Captain Ewing any 
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questions or request legal advice, but he testified at trial 
that he thought that Captain Ewing was his lawyer because 
Captain Ewing had represented him in an earlier matter 
and was present while he was being questioned. 
 
At the end of the interview, Brosius signed a written 
statement. The chief points stated were that: 1) Ivon had 
given Brosius a ride back to the base from the club; 2) 
another male soldier, whom he described, had accompanied 
them; 3) Ivon had a troubled relationship with her 
boyfriend; and 4) Brosius had last seen her at about 2:55 
a.m. Brosius's statement seems to have added little if 
anything of substance to what he had told other witnesses 
during the hours immediately after Ivon's body was 
discovered. The CID agents also took the clothing that 
Brosius had worn on the night of the murder, but it 
apparently did not yield any incriminating evidence. After 
the interview, Brosius returned to his unit. 
 
Brosius returned for further questioning on June 4 and 
5. At this time, he was warned of his rights under Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Article 31 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), 10 U.S.C. S 83. 
After receiving these warnings, Brosius waived his rights 
and eventually confessed to the murder. He said that he 
had returned to the base with Ivon and that no one else 
was in the car. When they reached the parking lot, he 
stated, they started to have intercourse, but he realized 
that this "wasn't right" because she was "like a sister" to 
him. He stated that he stabbed her in the chest and 
stomach and then, because she was looking at him, in the 
eyes. He said that he stabbed her about nine times. At the 
end of the confession, however, he stated: "I don't believe I 
did it and if I did I want help. I feel like I falsified the whole 
statement." 
 
II. 
 
The degree to which a federal habeas court may consider 
claims of errors committed in a military trial has long been 
the subject of controversy and remains unclear. Nearly 50 
years after it was decided, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), is still the leading 
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authority. In Burns, two soldiers were tried by court 
martial, found guilty of murder and rape, and sentenced to 
death. They filed habeas petitions claiming that they had 
been denied due process of law. Some of the claims appear 
to have presented pure questions of fact (e.g. , whether the 
petitioners were beaten and denied food and sleep before 
they confessed), while other claims presented either mixed 
questions or questions of law (e.g., whether, on the 
undisputed facts, their confessions were coerced). The 
district court dismissed the petition, and the court of 
appeals affirmed. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 
1952). The court of appeals applied the following standard: 
 
       [H]abeas will not lie to review questions raised and 
       determined, or raisable and determinable, in the 
       established military process, unless there has been 
       such gross violation of constitutional rights as to deny 
       the substance of a fair trial and, because of some 
       exceptional circumstance, the petitioner has not been 
       able to obtain adequate protection of that right in the 
       military process. 
 
Id. at 342. Applying this standard, the court reviewed each 
of the petitioner's allegations and found that none 
warranted relief. 
 
The Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of 6 to 2 but 
without a majority opinion. One member of the majority, 
Justice Minton, took the position that the Court could do 
no more than inquire whether the court martial had 
jurisdiction. Burns, 346 U.S. at 146-48 (Minton, J., 
concurring in judgment). However, the plurality opinion 
written by Chief Justice Vinson and joined by three other 
Justices concluded that the Court's inquiry was somewhat 
broader. The plurality stated that the petitioners' 
allegations "were sufficient to depict fundamental 
unfairness" and that the district court could have reviewed 
these claims de novo if the military courts had"manifestly 
refused to consider" them. Id. at 142. But because the 
military courts had "heard petitioners out on every 
significant allegation" and had "given fair consideration to 
each of the[ir] claims," the plurality stated, the petitioners 
had "failed to show that this military review was legally 
inadequate." Id. at 144-46. The plurality added that 
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"although the Court of Appeals may have erred in 
reweighing each item of relevant evidence in the trial 
record, it certainly did not err in holding that there was no 
need for a further hearing in the District Court." Id. at 146. 
Justice Jackson, the sixth member of the majority, 
concurred in the result without opinion. Id. 
 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, 
arguing that it was proper to determine in the habeas 
proceeding whether, based on the undisputed facts, viz., 
that the petitioners had been held incommunicado and 
repeatedly questioned over a period of five days, the 
petitioners' confessions had been unconstitutionally  
obtained.1 Burns, 346 U.S. at 154-55 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Although the rule that emerges from Burns is far from 
clear in all respects, it appears that a majority (the plurality 
plus Justice Minton) held that in considering a 
constitutional claim involving a pure question of law or a 
mixed question of law and fact, a habeas court may not 
exercise de novo review and may not go beyond considering 
whether the military courts "dealt fully and fairly" with the 
claim. Moreover, the plurality's treatment of the petitioners' 
coerced confession claim suggests that full and fair 
consideration was intended to mean no more than 
"hear[ing]" the petitioners "out." Burns, 346 U.S. at 144. 
Although it appears that the Judge Advocate General, then 
the highest reviewing officer, had not addressed the 
question whether the undisputed facts relating to the 
confessions established a violation of the governing 
Supreme Court precedent concerning unconstitutionally 
coerced confessions,2 the plurality rejected the coerced 
confession claim with the simple statement that"there was 
exhaustive inquiry into the background of the confessions 
-- with the taking of testimony from the persons most 
concerned with the making of these statements." Id. at 145. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The ninth Justice, Justice Frankfurter, did not vote to affirm or 
reverse but stated the Court should have put the case down for 
reargument. 346 U.S. at 150. 
 
2. See Burns, 346 U.S. at 154-55 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Lower courts have had difficulty applying the Burns "full 
and fair" test. The Tenth Circuit, which has the most 
experience with habeas petitions filed by service members 
due to the location of the Disciplinary Barracks at Ft. 
Leavenworth, Kansas, has stated that "[t]he federal courts' 
interpretation -- particularly this court's interpretation -- 
of the language in Burns has been anything but clear." 
Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1990); see 
also, e.g., Kauffman v. Sec. of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 
997 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (the test "has meant many things to 
many courts"). 
 
Our court's treatment of Burns has also been far from 
seamless. In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Parker, 399 
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1968), we interpreted Burns  narrowly. 
The petitioner argued that his confession had been 
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 
of the UCMJ, but we rejected that argument with the terse 
statement that "the district court, after determining that 
the military courts had given due consideration to 
petitioner's contentions, quite correctly refused to review 
and reevaluate the facts surrounding petitioner's 
allegations." Id. at 776. 
 
By contrast, in Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), we 
seemingly read Burns more expansively. Levy, a military 
doctor, was convicted by a general court martial of wilful 
disobedience of the lawful command of a superior officer, 
uttering public statements designed to promote disloyalty 
and disaffection among the troops, and wrongfully and 
dishonorably making intemperate, defamatory, provoking, 
contemptuous, disrespectful, and disloyal statements to 
other officers. See id. at 778. He contended that the articles 
under which he was convicted were too vague to satisfy due 
process. We suggested that a habeas court may examine de 
novo those constitutional claims "not dependent upon any 
evidentiary or factual construction." Id. at 783. The actual 
holding of the case, however, was limited to claims related 
to "the facial unconstitutionality of [a] statute" under which 
a petitioner was charged. Id. Any broader reading of Levy 
as requiring de novo review over all questions of law would 
be inconsistent with Burns, in which a majority of the 
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Court (the plurality plus Justice Minton) applied a 
deferential standard of review to the claims that, on the 
undisputed facts, the habeas petitioners' constitutional 
rights were violated. See Burns, 346 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that "the undisputed facts in [the] 
case ma[de] a prima facie case that [the Supreme Court's] 
rule on coerced confessions expressed in Watts v. Indiana, 
388 U.S. 49, was violated"). 
 
In the present case, we find it unnecessary to attempt 
any further explication of Burns. Whatever Burns means, 
we have no doubt that at least absent a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant 
was convicted, such as that raised in Levy, our inquiry in 
a military habeas case may not go further than our inquiry 
in a state habeas case. See Burns, 346 U.S. at 142 ("In 
military habeas corpus cases, even more than in state 
habeas corpus cases, it would be in disregard of the 
statutory scheme if the federal civil courts failed to take 
account of the prior proceedings . . .") (emphasis added). 
Thus, we will assume -- but solely for the sake of argument 
-- that we may review determinations made by the military 
courts in this case as if they were determinations made by 
state courts. Accordingly, we will assume that 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(e)(1) applies to findings of historical fact made by 
the military courts. Under this provision, "a determination 
of a factual issue made by a State court" is"presumed to 
be correct," and a habeas petitioner has "the burden of 
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 
convincing evidence." In considering other determinations 
made by the military courts, we will assume that 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d) applies. Under this provision, 
 
       [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
       a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
       State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
       claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
       proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
       Court of the United States; or 
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       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
       unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
       evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Matteo v. 
Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 891 (3d Cir. 
1999) (en banc). 
 
III. 
 
Brosius argues that his conviction must be reversed 
because, prior to his two interviews on June 2, he was not 
given the warnings prescribed by Miranda or Article 31(b) of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.S 831(b).3 
Article 31(b) differs from Miranda in that it requires 
warnings whenever a service member is "suspected of an 
offense" and is being interrogated. It may thus apply in 
situations in which a service member is not in "custody." 
See United States v. Baird, 851 F.2d 376, 383 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). We will discuss Miranda and Article 31(b) separately. 
 
A. 
 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that warnings 
must be administered before a person is subjected to 
"custodial interrogation," i.e., "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 
any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted). In 
this case, the Army Court of Military Review concluded that 
Brosius was not in "custody" when he was interviewed on 
June 2, and the court credited testimony that Brosius 
"voluntarily appeared before [the CID agents] as a friend of 
PFC Ivon wishing to provide them with information that 
might lead to the apprehension of her killer." 37 M.J. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This provision states: 
 
       No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any 
       statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense 
       without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and 
       advising him that he does not have to make any statement 
       regarding the offense of which he is accused . . . . 
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660. Whether a person is in "custody" for purposes of 
Miranda is not a factual question entitled to the 
presumption of correctness, see Thompson v. Keohane, 516 
U.S. 99 (1995), and therefore we ask whether the 
determination of the military courts that Brosius was not in 
custody is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). We hold that under these standards, 
the determination of the military courts must be sustained. 
 
Brosius argues that he was in custody at the time of the 
first interview on June 2 because his first sergeant, the 
highest-ranking noncommissioned officer in the unit,"sent" 
him to the orderly room to speak with the CID agents and 
because under Article 91(2) of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
S 891(2), Brosius was required to obey the first sergeant's 
orders. In making this argument, Brosius relies on the 
statement of Special Agent Allen that the first sergeant 
"sent" Brosius to the orderly room. However, when Special 
Agent Allen's testimony on this point is viewed in context 
and together with other pertinent testimony, it is apparent 
that there is no basis for overturning the Army Court of 
Military Review's determination that Brosius appeared 
before the CID agents voluntarily. 
 
Special Agent Allen testified as follows: 
 
       A. . . . [T]he First Sergeant told us there was a soldier 
       that stated that he was with her the night before, and 
       he asked if we wanted to see him. We said, "Yes if he's 
       in the area you can send him down." 
 
       Q. Okay. So the First Sergeant sent him down to the 
       orderly room? 
 
       A. Yes, sir. 
 
App. 1. 
 
Special Agent Nash explained the circumstances that led 
to Brosius's being "sent" to the orderly room. 4 Special Agent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Special Agent Nash's testimony on this point was apparently hearsay. 
Under Mil.R.Evid. 104(a), a trial judge is not bound by the rules of 
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Nash testified that Brosius "approached some of our agents 
or the First Sergeant, and the First Sergeant approached 
our agents while they were in the unit, saying that he was 
with PFC Ivon, and that he wanted to come and tell us 
what he knew about it." App. 18; see also id . at 30. When 
Brosius was asked how he had come to be interviewed at 
the base, he stated "[s]omebody from the orderly room . . . 
came down to my room where I was at the time, and said 
that the police, CID, wanted to speak to me about what 
happened the night before." App. at 80. 
 
Viewing all of this evidence together, we see no basis for 
rejecting the determination of the Army Court of Military 
Review that Brosius appeared voluntarily. Special Agent 
Nash's testimony directly supports that determination, and 
Special Agent Allen's use of the term "sent" is easily 
reconcilable with his testimony. A person who has 
expressed a desire to speak with someone may be"sent" to 
see that person when the person is available. ("After some 
time in the waiting room, the patient was sent  in to see the 
doctor.") 
 
We thus then turn to the second interview conducted on 
June 2 at the River Building. Brosius argues that he was in 
custody at the time of this interview because, according to 
the opinion of the Army Court of Military Review, Special 
Agent Allen "instructed" Brosius to go to the River Building, 
37 M.J. at 655, and, according to testimony given by 
Special Agent Robinson, Brosius was then "escorted" to the 
River Building by his section sergeant. App. 123. Brosius 
contends that, in the military, the word "escort" is 
synonymous with the word "guard." The government, by 
contrast, argues that Brosius had a friendly personal 
relationship with his section sergeant and that the sergeant 
simply gave him a ride to the River Building. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
evidence other than those pertaining to privileges and may consider 
hearsay in a suppression hearing. See United States v. Dababneh, 28 
M.J. 929, 934 (N.M.C.M.R. 1989) quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 
U.S. 171, 178 (1978). Hearsay may be considered in a suppression 
hearing in a federal court. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 
(1980). 
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The Army Court of Military Review, as previously noted, 
concluded that Brosius voluntarily appeared before the CID 
agents, and we accept that determination. Special Agent 
Allen testified as follows concerning the circumstances that 
led to Brosius's appearance at the River Building: 
 
       Q. . . . [W]hen he said that. . . he didn't want to talk 
       to you, what did you do? 
 
       A. Well, we had several other people to talk to, and I 
       told him "There's two lawyers down at the River 
       Building," you know, if he wanted to talk to a lawyer 
       about it or if he wanted to talk to someone about it , "go 
       down there and someone would be glad to talk to you 
       about it. 
 
App. 4-5. (emphasis added). Special Agent Allen added: 
 
       A. . . . I said, "Well, if you don't want to talk to us, 
       there are attorneys down at the River Building right 
       now, and if you want to go down there and talk to 
       them about it, go ahead." 
 
       Q. And then they did he? 
 
       A. I think he did. He had a Sergeant there with him. 
       I think it was his section Sergeant, whatever. I think he 
       took him down there. 
 
App. 13 (emphasis added). 
 
Brosius himself said little about the circumstances that 
brought him to the River Building, stating only that his 
section sergeant, who was "an acquaintance," gave him a 
ride to that facility. App. 75. 
 
Considering the relevant portions of the record that have 
been brought to our attention, we see no basis for rejecting 
the determination of the Army Court of Military Review that 
Brosius was not in custody when he spoke with the agents 
at the River Building. According to Special Agent Allen, 
Special Agent Robinson and he did not direct Brosius to go 
to the River Building but merely told him to go there "if he 
wanted to talk to a lawyer about it or if he wanted to talk 
to someone about it." Brosius himself does not appear to 
have testified that he felt compelled to go to the River 
Building. Since the River Building was about 12 miles from 
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the base, Brosius needed transportation to get there. 
Special Agent Robinson's use of the term "escorted" may 
simply mean that the section sergeant gave him a ride. In 
ordinary speech, a person who is "escorted" is not 
necessarily deprived of freedom of movement. If the military 
courts did not think that Special Agent Robinson's use of 
the term carried a special meaning due to the military 
context, we are not inclined to second guess that 
interpretation. Accordingly, we see no ground for holding 
that Brosius's Miranda rights were violated on June 2. 
 
B. 
 
We now consider Brosius's argument that the failure to 
give him warnings on June 2 violated his rights under 
Article 31(b) of the UCMJ. As noted, Article 31(b) applies 
whenever a service member who is "suspected of an 
offense" is interrogated, whether or not the member is in 
custody. Statements obtained in violation of Article 31(b) 
may not be received in evidence at a court martial against 
the person who made them. 10 U.S.C. S 83(d). 
 
The parties disagree sharply about whether Brosius was 
a suspect at the time of the June 2 interviews. Brosius 
maintains that a reasonable investigator would have 
regarded him as a suspect immediately upon learning that 
Ivon had driven him back to the base alone in the early 
morning hours of June 2. The government argues that the 
agents were focusing on other suspects, chiefly Ivon's 
estranged boyfriend, and did not regard Brosius as a 
suspect. 
 
We find it unnecessary to decide whether Brosius was 
"suspected" of an offense on June 2. Even if he was 
"suspected" and even if the statements that he provided on 
June 2 should have been suppressed under 10 U.S.C. 
S 83(d), the failure to suppress those statements was 
harmless error. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 
949 (3d Cir. 1998) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, an error 
is harmless if it did not have a substantial and injurious 
effect or influence on the verdict). If the confession that 
Brosius made on June 4 and 5 is not suppressed, a subject 
that we discuss below, the statements made on June 2 
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were obviously harmless. As noted, at the June 2 interview, 
Brosius stated that: 1) PFC Ivon gave him a ride back to the 
base from a nightclub; 2) another male soldier rode with 
them; 3) she had a troubled relationship with her boyfriend; 
and 4) he had last seen her at about 2:55 a.m. on the 
morning of the murder. These statements added nothing to 
Brosius's later confession. Indeed, they do not appear to 
have added much if anything to evidence available from 
other witnesses or sources. Prior to the June 2 interview, 
Brosius had told other witnesses who testified at trial that 
he had driven home with the victim on the night of her 
murder; that he might have been the last person to see her 
alive; and that another person had accompanied them in 
the car. In addition, the log book at a gate revealed that 
Ivon's car had returned at 2:30 a.m. with two occupants. 
Accordingly, the failure to suppress evidence obtained 
during the June 2 interview was harmless under any 
standard. 
 
Brosius, however, contends that, because warnings were 
improperly withheld on June 2, his subsequent confession 
on June 4 and 5 must be suppressed. We cannot agree. In 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme Court 
considered the appropriate remedy when a suspect in 
custody is first interviewed without Miranda warnings and 
is later given proper warnings and interviewed again. In 
Elstad, the defendant was taken into custody for 
committing a burglary. Id. at 300-01. He was initially 
questioned at the scene of the arrest and made an 
incriminating admission. Id. After he was taken to the 
police station, Miranda warnings were given, he signed a 
written waiver, and confessed to the crime. Id . at 301-02. 
The state appellate court held that, even if the confession 
had not resulted from actual compulsion, the defendant's 
initial statement had a coercive impact because it had let 
the " `cat . . . out of the bag.' " Id. at 303 (citation omitted). 
The state appellate court consequently held that the later 
statement had to be suppressed. Id. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "absent 
deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the 
initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an 
unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of 
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compulsion." Id. at 314. The Court added that "[a] 
subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a 
suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement 
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that 
precluded admission of the earlier statement." Id. at 314. 
 
That is precisely what occurred here. Brosius made 
unwarned statements on June 2. He went home, and two 
days passed. On June 4th, he was called back for a second 
interview. He was then given proper warnings, and he 
subsequently confessed. There is no reason to believe that 
these later statements were not "knowingly and voluntarily 
made." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. 
 
Brosius argues that the circumstances surrounding the 
interview at the River Building were improper because 
Brosius was led to believe that Captain Ewing, who was 
actually a member of the prosecution team, was serving as 
Brosius's attorney. The government responds that, 
although Captain Ewing had previously represented 
Brosius in an unrelated matter, Captain Ewing and the 
agents made it clear that Captain Ewing was working with 
the prosecution in relation to the Ivon murder investigation. 
 
Captain Ewing's role at the June 2 interview at the River 
Building was inadvisable, but it does not call for the 
suppression of the confession that Brosius provided days 
later after receiving proper warnings. Brosius relies on the 
statement in Elstad that a prior failure to warn may call for 
the suppression of a subsequent statement made after 
receiving proper warnings if "deliberately coercive or 
improper tactics" were used in the first interrogation. 470 
U.S. at 314. This rule, however, relates to situations in 
which the tactics used in the first, improper interrogation 
had a coercive effect that led to the later admissions. 
Nothing of that sort happened here. As we have noted, 
Brosius did not provide any new, incriminating information 
during the interviews on June 2. He was not even in the 
position of the defendant in Elstad, who had"let the cat out 
of the bag" when he was initially questioned. Brosius's 
statements during the June 2 interviews cannot have 
coerced him to make his subsequent confession. 
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IV. 
 
Brosius's final argument is that his confession should be 
suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981). In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that "an 
accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates 
further communications, exchanges, or conversations with 
the police." Id. at 484-85. Brosius maintains that he 
requested counsel during the interview on June 2 and 
therefore his subsequent questioning without counsel was 
improper. 
 
We reject Brosius's Edwards argument. Edwards applies 
only where the suspect makes a request for counsel while 
in custody. See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 
536 (7th Cir. 1999)(citing cases); United States v. Bautista, 
145 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 1998); cf. Alston v. Redman, 
34 F.3d 1237, 1249 (3d Cir. 1994) (Edwards does not apply 
where counsel was requested outside the context of 
"custodial interrogation"). Here, because Brosius was not in 
custody on June 2, Edwards does not apply. 
 
V. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the order of the District 
Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                17 
